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Do Local Governments Save and Spend across Budget Cycles?  
Evidence from North Carolina 
 
Abstract 
 The fiscal crisis encountered by state-local governments since 2008 has again made 
prominent the issue of how to better prepare for and stabilize expenditures during recessions. 
Does the economic stabilization function of government, and its theory, still hold? Previous 
studies focus on federal and state levels; only a few look at local governments. This article 
explores whether localities save and spend across the boom-bust cycle; we intend to identify 
determinants of local government savings and estimate the impact of savings on stabilizing 
expenditures. Unlike some early evidence that shows counter-cyclical stabilization properties of 
local unreserved general fund balance, the empirical results of our study on North Carolina 
counties do not support the stabilization role by localities. This study carries timely and 
important implications for state/local policy making and financial operations; it also adds to the 
literature on the stabilization function of government.  
Keywords: local financial management, fund balance policy, stabilization function of 
government 
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Do Local Governments Save and Spend across Budget Cycles?  
Evidence from North Carolina 
 
Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of John Maynard Keynes in 1936 and especially the 
publication of Richard Musgrave‘s Theory of Public Finance in 1959, the economic stabilization 
function of government has been gradually and widely accepted; but counter-cyclical spending 
was assumed to be the sole responsibility of the national government in the standard Musgrave 
theory (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). Later, Edward Gramlich (1987) advocated pursuing 
counter-cyclical policies for stabilizing expenditures at the subnational level (Hou and Moynihan 
2008). In the past two decades, public finance scholars have produced a rich literature that 
addresses key questions concerning the adoption, use, and consequences of budget stabilization 
funds, reserve funds, and other subnational fiscal stabilization tools, with almost an exclusive 
focus on the state level (Marlowe 2005). Empirical research offers support for the positive 
impact of counter-cyclical spending on fiscal stress at the state level (Douglas and Gaddie 2002; 
Hou 2003a, 2005; Sobel and Holcombe 1996; Wagner and Elder 2005). Even though the 
political economy of the past several decades has implicitly ascribed both state and local 
governments an important role in the stabilization function (Marlowe 2005), so far we know very 
little about the practice of counter-cyclical spending at the local level. Only a few studies in the 
literature looked at the role of local slack resources, either in the form of fund balances or 
stabilization funds, in local government finance and their impact on decisions about spending 
and revenues (Gianakis and Snow 2007; Hendrick 2006; Hou 2008; Marlowe 2005).The recent 
fiscal crisis has again brought the attention of academics and practitioners to the issue of how to 
better prepare for, and stabilize expenditures in, an economic downturn. Therefore, it becomes 
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even more urgent than before to examine whether local governments possess the policy 
inclination, fiscal capacity, and policy tools to act counter-cyclically, because federal and state 
governments often cut their grants to localities in an economic downturn (or cannot provide as 
much as localities need, as in the most recent stimulus package).  
The state of North Carolina offers a good case for us to examine the validity of the 
economic stabilization theory of local government. As a consequence of its rampant local 
government default on their municipal bonds during the Great Depression,
1
North Carolina 
developed a state oversight system that is considered a model by bond rating agencies. Because 
of the financial discipline of its local governments and effective state oversight and technical 
assistance, North Carolina leads the nation in the number of local governments with the highest 
bond rating (Coe 2007). Though 90 percent of states have adopted budget stabilization funds as a 
formal counter-cyclical fiscal policy instrument (NASBO 2007), budget stabilization funds 
remains rare among local governments; they rely mostly on year-end balances of the general 
fund. 
2
 This study attempts to examine the practices of such an exemplary system in managing 
local government fund balances and thereby adds to the small literature on counter-cyclical fiscal 
and budgetary policies at the local level. The empirical results of this study may carry timely and 
important implications for policy making and financial operation in the state and local sector. 
To operationalize this study, we choose to focus on two research questions: First, what 
factors affect the level of general fund balances in county governments (in North Carolina)? 
Second, what is the impact of general fund balances on local expenditures
3
 in general and their 
stabilizing effects during economic downturns in particular? The two research questions cover 
two sides of the same issue. Whether the balance of a locality‘s general fund is large or small in 
level and ratio, presumably there is an implicit policy behind the balance. By identifying the 
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determinants of general fund balance, we can estimate the separate effects of revenue sources, 
local government programs, and socio-economic factors on the fund balances; then we estimate 
the effects of fund balances on local expenditures. Thus, we evaluate whether local governments 
exercise the stabilization role through fiscal policy. 
This paper is divided into seven sections. Following the introduction is a brief description 
of the budget stabilization theory and local fund balance policy. The third section introduces 
North Carolina counties‘ finance structure and their fund balance policy. The fourth section 
reviews current literature on counter-cyclical expenditure stabilization at the local level, followed 
by a presentation of model specification, data, and estimation methodology. The sixth section 
presents empirical results with our interpretation, and the final section concludes with a 
discussion.  
Budget Stabilization and Local Fund Balance Policy 
The study of economic stabilization by government emerged with the ground-breaking 
work of John Maynard Keynes in 1936. Scholars have since studied how central governments 
could adopt counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies to best deal with financial crisis in 
order to achieve economic stability over the business cycle (Hou 2003b). The economic 
stabilization function of government has been gradually and widely accepted with the publication 
of Richard Musgrave‘s Theory of Public Finance in 1959. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy has, 
however, been assumed to be the sole responsibility of the central government in the standard (or 
conventional) Musgrave theory (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). Edward Gramlich (1987) 
expanded the idea of practicing counter-cyclical fiscal policies to subnational governments (Hou 
and Moynihan 2008). Gramlich observed that the conventional wisdom that only central 
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governments should conduct fiscal stabilization policy might have been seriously misguided 
because empirical studies have shown that the migration of production factors are slow and 
limited in the short run; therefore, states should practice fiscal policies to stabilize their budgets. 
In a recession, a subnational government could resort to capital markets or use intergovernmental 
grants to implement a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. However, intergovernmental grants are 
often unreliable when grantor governments are also in fiscal distress. Incurring public debt in 
economic downturns is technically sound; but drastic fiscal measures by state-local governments 
in bust years to balance their budget often adversely affect their credit rating, thus eroding their 
borrowing capacity on the capital market. Constitutional or statutory debt limitations also impose 
constraints on how much governments can borrow. Therefore, the only reliable means a 
subnational government could resort to in a recession is its fiscal reserves accumulated in boom 
years (Hou 2003b).  
The literature on fiscal federalism also touches upon the issue of what role the central 
government should play in providing ―insurance‖ against exogenous shocks of various sorts in 
the intergovernmental fiscal system. When state and local governments subjected to balanced-
budget constraints are forced to cut spending in fiscal distress, it makes sense for the central 
government to provide some fiscal assistance so that they can maintain their level of spending. 
Indeed several scholars argued that the most effective countercyclical program would be one of 
federal assistance to state and localities in the context of recent recessions. However, centrally 
provided insurance to state and local governments comes at a price due to an obvious moral 
hazard problem. The availability of central insurance may create an adverse incentive for state 
and local governments not to make sensible provision for time of financial difficulties. They may 
always expect the central government to extend its assistance to relieve their fiscal distress from 
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all sorts of causes. This could create a rationale for fiscal bailouts and a general softening of 
budget constraints (Oates 2005). Here the fundamental challenge is in the design of fiscal 
institutions and budgetary procedures that address these incentive problems in ways that create 
hard budget constraints for state and local governments.  
State and local governments accumulate reserves via either formal or informal vehicles. 
The formal means of saving is by budget stabilization funds, popularly called ―rainy day funds,‖ 
which are created as a result of policy design. The finance law in most states usually includes 
stipulations regarding the deposits of previous-year budget surplus into the budget stabilization 
fund (Hou 2004). States vary a lot in whether they allow local governments to create their budget 
stabilization funds. Some states allow their local governments to formally create budget 
stabilization funds, but others do not (Hou 2008). The informal vehicle refers to resources 
accumulated in the general fund, other governmental funds, and enterprise funds that can be used 
for expenditure stabilization across business cycles (Marlowe 2005). At the local level, formal 
saving devices are not as widely used as by the states (Hou 2008).Local governments rarely 
establish a separate budget stabilization fund, relying more on the informal form of fiscal 
reserves, such as unreserved general fund balances (Marlowe 2005).  North Carolina counties, 
for instance, do not preserve rainy day funds. This study focuses on year-end balances of the 
general fund to test our research questions.  
State governments and other stakeholders have a great interest in monitoring the fiscal 
conditions of their local governments. When local governments face severe fiscal distress, they 
may not be able to make timely payments to bondholders, vendors, and/or employees. They may 
also have to significantly cut back the provision of some essential local public services, creating 
a very visible and undesirable situation. Meanwhile, current and potential residents and 
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businesses may face an increasing tax burden because local governments attempt to generate 
sufficient revenue to deal with the financial difficulties. In addition, the negative impact goes 
beyond the distressed community. Surrounding areas are sometimes forced to extend their 
coverage of service delivery to the distressed community without commensurate compensation. 
The financial difficulties of the distressed local government may hurt not only its own credit 
rating, but also that of other localities and the state. Finally, all the state‘s taxpayers may suffer 
from having to pay for grants and/or bailouts to the distressed community (Kloha, Weissert and 
Kleine 2005). 
Therefore, probably no other single item in a local government‘s financial statements 
attracts more attention than fund balance (Gauthier 2009a), which is the difference between the 
assets and liabilities reported in the financial statements by the end of each fiscal year, 
4
 as it is 
often used as an indicator to evaluate local fiscal health. State governments use fund balance as 
one of the major indicators to identify financially distressed local governments so state and local 
actions can be taken to restore financial stability (Kloha, Weissert and Kleine 2005). Credit 
rating agencies often assess state and local governments‘ creditworthiness based on the levels of 
their fund balance and unreserved fund balance in a government‘s general fund. Similarly, laws 
and regulations also govern the appropriate levels of fund balance and unreserved fund balance 
for state and local governments (GFOA 2002).  
The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends that state and local 
governments establish a formal policy on the level of unreserved fund balance that should be 
maintained in the general fund. The unreserved fund balance is expected to safeguard against the 
effects of unanticipated natural disasters and economic downturns and to help stabilize tax and 
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fee rates and public service levels (Shelton and Tyer 2000; Coe 2007). Fund balance levels are 
also a crucial consideration in long-term financial planning (GFOA 2002).  
In practice, state and local governments often formulate a fund balance policy that 
establishes a minimum level at which fund balance is to be maintained. GFOA recommends that 
unreserved general fund balance should represent no less than five to 15 percent of general 
operating revenues, or no less than one to two months of general fund operating expenditures 
(Gauthier 2002). A minimum of five percent of unreserved fund balance is recommended by 
GFOA for larger, in particular state, governments because larger governments often have 
diversified and less volatile revenues and operating expenditures and normally find it easier to 
predict contingencies than do smaller ones (Joyce 2001; Hou 2004). Meanwhile, a number of 
reasons could justify a significantly higher minimum target level for local governments, 
including significant volatility in operating revenues or expenditures, exposure to natural 
disasters, rapidly growing budgets, or disparities in timing between revenue collections and 
expenditures (Gauthier 2009b).  
North Carolina Counties 
 This study uses counties as the unit of analysis because they are the front-liners in public 
service provision and the dominant form of local government in North Carolina. Benton (2002) 
suggests that counties have ―become full-service governments‖ and ―are also beginning to rival 
municipalities as major providers of services that traditionally have been dominated by cities‖ (p. 
466). Counties in southern states have traditionally held all kinds of responsibilities as a ―strong 
unit performing a large number of functions‖ (p. 19). They have fewer competing local 
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government structures than in other regions of the country, thereby becoming the dominant form 
of local government (Marando 1979, p. 414). 
Several features distinguish counties in North Carolina from those in other states. First, in 
North Carolina almost all local governmental responsibilities rest with counties (and cities). The 
majority of local expenditures are also made through counties (and cities), rather than through 
special districts, school districts, and authorities, which are relatively much more important in 
many other states. Second, local responsibilities for a number of major ―people‖ services, such as 
public health, education, and welfare, rest mainly with counties in North Carolina rather than 
with cities or special districts as in other states, and the county commissioners have limited 
discretion in whether or how much to fund these services. Third, county governments in North 
Carolina have more extensive authority than those in other states to provide urban type of 
services such as water and sewer services, solid waste collection and disposal, and fire protection 
etc. Finally, North Carolina has a state-local revenue system that relies mainly on four major 
taxes– property, general sales, individual and corporate income, and gasoline. Rates for the sales 
and income taxes are relatively high in comparison to the same type of taxes in other states, 
whereas rates for the property tax are low compared to those in other jurisdictions. Since the 
property tax is relatively less important in North Carolina than it is in other states, whereas 
income and sales taxes have greater significance, the revenue structure of North Carolina tends 
to be more sensitive than that of most states to fluctuations in the economy (Bell 2007).  
North Carolina has a long tradition of using professional managers in local governments 
(Stenberg 2007) 
5
 and has developed a conservative budgeting and financial management system 
after the Great Depression. The legislature created a Local Government Commission (LGC) 
under the State Treasurer‘s Office to impose financial controls and assist local governments in 
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trouble. North Carolina is the only state that is legally responsible for issuing all local debt 
(Shelton and Tyer 2000; Coe 2007). The LGC recommends that localities maintain a minimum 
unreserved fund balance of 8 percent of annual expenditures, and retain a much higher amount of 
fund balances (Coe 2007). The LGC also proactively works with local governments to resolve 
their identified financial problems.  
Literature Review 
 The existing literature on budget stabilization focuses on federal and state governments; 
only in recent years did some scholars begin to pay attention to the local level. We review this 
literature in two sub-areas that are related to this paper: determinants of fund balance and effects 
of the saved balances.  
Determinants of the Size of Unreserved Fund Balance 
The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends 5-15 percent as the 
benchmark of state-local savings; but previous studies found localities do not seem to show the 
same propensity to limit their savings as states do and that localities maintain much higher levels. 
Minnesota cities (n = 103) kept an average 53 percent of their current expenditures as general 
fund balance in the 1990-2000period. The fund balance was more than needed for cash flow 
purposes in over half of the cities, and was equal to or more than a full year‘s current 
expenditures in 20 percent of them(Marlowe 2005).Chicago suburban municipalities kept a 
median 53 to 66 percent of unreserved fund balance from 1997 to 2003 (Hendrick 2006). Most 
Mississippi counties maintained an unreserved fund balance ranging from 25 to 237 percent of 
their expenditures in 1995 and 1999 (Stewart 2009).  
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Only a few studies attempted to explain the factors that determine the size of unreserved 
fund balance at the local level; and they reached no consensus. Hendrick (2006) found current 
fiscal performance, indicated as operating deficits or surplus, had a strong effect on municipal 
fund balances. She also found that debt levels had a negative impact: The higher the level of 
municipal debt was, the less reserves were used to fund capital expenditures. Size was another 
factor: Larger governments appeared to accumulate less reserves than smaller ones. 
Municipalities that were more politically conservative, reformed, and professional tended to 
accumulate more reserves. Not surprisingly, wealthier municipalities with lower spending needs 
had higher reserves than those that were poor and had higher spending needs. Hendrick‘s 
analysis demonstrated that the main purpose of reserves was to cushion for unpredictable events 
and short-run instability. Unreserved fund balances became more important and interchangeable 
during fiscal downturns while maintaining reserves to compensate for risks became less 
important.  
Stewart (2009) also found that current fiscal condition significantly influenced the level 
of Mississippi counties‘ unreserved fund balances during two periods of relative resource 
abundance and scarcity. The only variable of significance during both periods was debt level, 
which had a negative impact on unreserved fund balance. Other fiscal, demographic, and 
political variables included in the study explained little variation in fund balances, which may 
suggest that Mississippi counties were unique within themselves and it was hard to identify 
common factors to explain the behavior of unreserved fund balance.  
Thus, it seems that applying a 5-15 percent savings benchmark across all jurisdictions 
does not provide a sufficient guide when localities assume different patterns in accumulating 
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savings. Future research on this topic may need to focus on other variables to explain the 
behavior of unreserved fund balances.  
The Effects of Unreserved Fund Balance on Government Expenditures 
Studies of fiscal reserves at the state level find strong evidence that state savings help to 
maintain the level of government spending during downturn years (Sobel and Holcombe 1996; 
Hou 2003a, 2005). Few studies, however, provide direct evidence about the effects of unreserved 
fund balance on the stabilization of government expenditures at the local level. Marlowe (2005) 
examined whether local slack fiscal resources in the form of general fund balance had similar 
counter-cyclical effects; he found that municipal fiscal reserves in general had a marginal impact 
on the direction and size of current expenditure gaps, but unreserved general fund balance posed 
a counter-cyclical stabilizing effect.  
Hendrick (2006) found some significant, positive impact of unreserved fund balance on 
the percentage change of expenditures with pooled data for Chicago suburban municipalities, but 
the results were not reliable for individual years. The analysis suggests that municipal fiscal 
slack has ―a fairly complex relationship with governments‘ other fiscal structural features and 
environment,‖ which makes it difficult to detect the effects of fiscal slack on alleviating fiscal 
distress. Future research should attempt to develop a ―theoretical model that incorporates 
relevant managerial, organizational, and political features…‖ (p. 43).  
Hou (2008) investigated the determinants of the size of local fund balances and the 
impact of fund balances on local expenditures in downturn years. He suggested a number of 
parameters for the analysis of local governments‘ fiscal behavior in economic fluctuations, 
including states‘ permission for their localities to create their own rainy day fund, local 
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governments‘ adoption of a formal or informal counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and revenue 
portfolio and professionalism of local governments. The empirical results of the study based on 
Georgia County data showed that local governments had few alternatives other than coping 
during economic downturns, given their less diversified revenue portfolio and strict balanced 
budget requirement. This study continues on Hou‘s (2008) exploration. 
Model Specification, Data, and Methodology 
Following the empirical framework adopted by previous research, we conduct empirical 
analysis to examine the factors that affect the level of general fund balances in North Carolina 
counties and the impact of these balances on county general fund expenditures in general and 
their stabilizing effects during economic downturns in particular, using a dataset of all the 100 
counties in North Carolina for the period of 1990-2007. Since the sample period covers two most 
recent, full business cycles, point estimates thus obtained may bear more directly to current 
practices in local governments.  
Dependent Variables 
To identify determinants of fund balances (answer our first research question), we use 
two dependent variable: fund balance and the balance as a share of overall expenditures. To 
estimate the effects of the balance (the second research question), our dependent variables are 
total expenditure, and year-to-year change (first difference) of total expenditure. To evaluate 
expenditure fluctuations, we construct an expenditure gap variable as the difference between 
actual expenditures and expenditures projected from a linear trend. Following previous studies, 
county expenditures are predicted as below: 
Eit
*  ai  biT  
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where  is the predicted expenditure for county i in year t,  the constant for county i,  the 
linear trend coefficient for county i , and T the value of the year in year T. Then the expenditure 
gap is expressed as the difference between the actual and the predicted expenditures as a 
percentage of the predicted expenditure: 
Expenditure Gap = 
E  E*
E*
 
Positive expenditure gaps are expected in boom years, whereas negative expenditure gaps may 
arise during economic downturns.  
Explanatory Variables 
To investigate the first research question, we choose five groups of explanatory variables: 
revenues, expenditures, economic indicators, social indicators, and county size. Revenue 
variables include the major revenue sources for county governments; these are property tax, sales 
tax, and intergovernmental revenue. Prior research indicates that the composition of governments‘ 
revenue sources determines the stability of their revenue and in turn the level of their fund 
balance. Governments could plan on stable revenue sources more than on cyclical ones, e.g. fines 
and fees (Stewart 2009). In contrast, they may have to use the unreserved fund balance to smooth 
the tax rate and offset erratic revenue fluctuations (Massey and Tyer 1990; Stewart 2009). 
Therefore, stable revenue sources would help governments to accumulate a higher level of fund 
balance (Marlowe 2005; Stewart 2009). Since property tax and local option sales taxes are the 
two most important revenue sources for North Carolina counties (though sales taxes are more 
prone to business cycle fluctuations), they are expected to facilitate maintaining fund balance. 
Intergovernmental grants to the county are more volatile because federal and state governments 
are likely to cut grants when they are under fiscal distress. Previous studies posited that local 
Eit
*
ai bi
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governments would accumulate more fiscal slack as a shield against revenue shocks if they have 
a heavier reliance on intergovernmental grants (Hendrick 2006; Stewart 2009). However, the 
negative relationship found between grants and fund balance suggests that local governments 
might not recognize the risk involved in relying on such a revenue source (Stewart 2009) or that 
they might not have the capacity to cushion against such cuts that lead to unavoidably reduced 
local revenues.   
County expenditures by function include expenditures for salaries and wages, capital 
outlays, and other operating purposes. Hendrick (2006) suggested that the levels of capital 
spending and total government spending, as measures of alternative sources of slack or fiscal 
flexibility, should have a negative impact on fund balance. In this study, we test the effects of 
different categories of spending on unreserved fund balance. Data for all the above-mentioned 
financial variables were collected from the Annual Financial Information Forms issued by the 
State Treasurer‘s Office in various years.  
We include county per capita income and unemployment rate as the third group of 
explanatory variables to capture the effects of economic factors on our dependent variables. As 
suggested by previous studies (Stewart 2009; Wagner 2003), we expect per capita income to be 
positively correlated with unreserved fund balance and unemployment rate negatively correlated. 
The income data are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; the unemployment 
rate data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Social indicators are the size of population, population squared, and shares of the school- 
age and the senior groups in the population, obtained from the North Carolina Office of State 
Budget and Management. Racial and ethnic diversity and the number of eligible people entitled 
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to retirement may influence the behavior of the fund balance (Marlowe 2004; Stewart 2009); but 
such data are not available. Finally, we construct three dummy variables of county size by 
population to test the effects of the size of a jurisdiction on our dependent variables. The county 
size dummies were constructed according to the classification of the North Carolina Treasurer‘s 
Office that roughly divides the 100 counties into four groups by their size of population; there 
are around 25 counties in each group.  
We test the effects of fund balances on county expenditures and expenditure gaps. Fund 
balances are expected to have a positive impact on total expenditures. If fund balances have a 
positive impact on the expenditure gap during downturn years, they can be said to have a 
counter-cyclical effect. In contrast, they may have a procyclical effect if they increase a positive 
expenditure gap in booming years or enlarge a negative expenditure gap in lean years (Marlowe 
2005).  
Revenue sources, economic indicators, social indicators, and county size variables are 
also included in the models. Higher tax revenues are expected to lead to higher expenditures. The 
effects on the expenditure gap depend on their stability over the business cycle.  Grants are also 
an important variable because they may create cash flow problems that can be addressed only by 
accumulating more adequate fund balances by local governments (Marlowe 2005). This study 
includes this variable to test its potential effects on county expenditures and expenditure gaps. 
Income and unemployment are included in the models to capture the variability in county 
economic conditions. The four social indicators are used to test their effects on the spending 
decisions of county governments. County size dummies are also included as controls. Table 1 
provides the descriptive statistics of all variables included in this analysis. 
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[Table 1 here] 
To answer our first research question, we estimate two regression models; per capita fund 
balance and fund balance share are regressed on the above-mentioned five groups of independent 
variables. To address the second research question, we estimate several empirical models to 
explore the effects of fund balances, both in level and ratio, on total county expenditures, the first 
difference of total expenditures, and expenditure gaps over the business cycle.   
Estimation Methodology 
We use the Newey-West estimator to deal with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the dataset. OLS estimates are computed, and standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. We also add in county fixed effects in the model to control for time-invariant 
unobservable factors, and year fixed effects to control for yearly statewide changes. 
6
 
As certain county-specific characteristics may have differential effects on county 
expenditure gaps in various years, we estimate a Heckman two-stage selection model to address 
the potential selection bias. Population growth may create differential impact on individual 
county governments given the specific context of each county. Changes in debt service could 
affect the current revenues available depending on individual county debt service schedules and 
capital improvement plans (Marlowe 2005). In addition, the differences in the composition of 
revenue portfolio may also affect a county‘s capacity in adjusting to the changes in its economic 
conditions. Therefore, population growth, changes in debt service, and shares of property tax, 
sales tax, and intergovernmental revenue are included in the first-stage to estimate the likelihood 
for a county to experience a downturn year or upturn year.  
Empirical Results 
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Determinants of General Fund Balances 
Results on the determinants of fund balances, both in level and in ratio, are presented in 
Table 2. Among the major revenue sources, property tax exerts a statistically significant 
influence—each dollar of revenue from this source can raise balances by 35 cents or 0.05 
percentage points. Given the average level of fund balances of 96 dollars or 22 percent of total 
expenditure, the 205 dollar average from this source can increase fund balances by 72 dollars, a 
three-quarters increase in level, or 11 percentage points, a 50 percent increase in ratio. Also 
statistically significant is revenue from the sales tax, for which the magnitude is particularly 
large: Each dollar from this source can boost fund balance by as much as 1.36 dollars in level or 
0.16 percentage points. In other words, the 79 dollar average sales tax revenue can raise fund 
balances by 107 dollars, more than double the fund balances, or 12 percentage point, also an over 
50 percent increase. Intergovernmental revenue does not pose a significant effect, probably 
because these grants all come with a specified purpose for use in the current fiscal year so that 
they do not add much to year-end balances.  
[Table 2 here] 
Among the major expenditure categories, only capital outlay posts a statistically 
significant, negative effect in the ratios model: Each dollar of outlay reduces the fund balance by 
0.014 percentage points; thus an average county with 45 dollars outlay in this category will have 
their fund balanced cut by 0.63 percentage points, which is only a 2.8 percent reduction off the 
average balance ratio, not a remarkable size. The two economic indicators are both significant 
(marginally significant in the level model), with the expected sign. Wealthier counties tend to 
have more in their year-end fund balances, both in the level and the ratio form. Per thousand 
dollar increase in per capita personal income can raise fund balance by 4.6 dollars or 0.91 
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percentage points. An average county with their personal income at the 12,929 dollar level can 
expect to have about 60 extra dollars in their balance or over 11 percentage points above the 
average 22 percent level; thus, this wealth effect is quite substantial. Higher unemployment rates 
pulls down fund balances, each percentage point by 1.5 dollars in level or 0.44 percentage points 
in ratio. An average county in an average year (with the unemployment rate at 5.73) may expect 
a fall of close to 9 dollars in level or 2.57 percentage points.  
Of the social indicators, the shares of the young and the old in total population do not 
generate statistically significant results. Population size points to economies of scale – larger 
counties tend to maintain smaller fund balances in ratio; that is, the size of a locality matters in 
the negative direction. This effect, however, is not linear, as indicated by the positive sign of the 
quadratic term of this variable. The county size dummies are not significant; potentially the 
population variable may have picked up the effect. We tried removing these dummies but 
obtained no observable, statistically significant difference. 
Effects of Fund Balances on Expenditures 
We then test the effects of previous year fund balances (t-1) on total expenditures. The 
dependent variables are per capita real expenditure and the first difference (annual change) in 
total expenditure, thereby making the interpretation of the results straightforward. Results of this 
test are shown in table 3. 
[Table 3 here] 
Fund balances carried forward from the previous year exert a small but significant effect 
on total expenditures: Per dollar of balance can increase expenditure by 15 cents, that is about 14 
dollars increase for an average county (with a mean of 96 dollars of balance), which is a 2.6 
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percent push on the average of 549 dollars of total expenditure. Fund balance as a percent of total 
expenditure, however, is not statistically significant.  
The three major revenue sources all present significant and large effects on total 
expenditures. Each additional dollar of property tax or intergovernmental grant is associated with 
an increase of over 80 cents in total expenditures. Of particular interest is the large effect of sales 
tax revenue on total expenditure: each dollar from this source adds between 3.11 and 3.28 dollars 
to the expenditure side; however, based on our limited data we cannot yet offer a reasonably 
satisfactory answer.  
The economic indicators and the young and the old shares in the population do not 
produce significant results. The non-linearity of population size keeps its significance. Total 
expenditure first rises with size, at 1.54 dollars for per thousand more residents. Then it drops, 
confirming again the economies of scale. The county size dummies correspond to this finding: 
All three are negative with two being significant, i.e., all spend less than the small counties. 
Medium sized (50,000-100,000) and medium-small sized (25,000-50,000) counties are spending 
between 70 and 75 dollars less per capita than the (default) small (<25,000) counties. This result 
points again to two issues: First, the county at the front line of service provision shoulders the 
task of supporting the daily life of residents; large or small, their functions are essential so that 
being small may in fact push up total expenditures. Second and related to the first, economies of 
scale is a factor we should not neglect. 
Of the annual changes in total expenditure, fund balance as a percent of total expenditure 
is significant: Every percentage point can account for 83 cents in the marginal increase in total 
expenditure. The other significant factor is intergovernmental grants, each dollar accounting for 
about 50 cents of the annual outlay increase. Given the average amount from this source of 126 
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dollars, intergovernmental grants can potentially account for 62 dollars, 3.6 times the annual 
increase. Population and its squared term retain their significance and expected sign in this 
specification.  
 
Effects of Fund Balances on Expenditures during Downturns 
 Our final test is to identify the effects of fund balances on expenditures during the 
downturn and upturn years of the economic cycle, which can be taken as the local government 
activity cycle. We do so by decomposing the expenditure gap variable into two groups: Those 
smaller than 0 are a proxy for the local downturn years and those larger than 0 are a proxy for the 
local upturn years.
7 
We use the James Heckman two-stage sample selection estimator for the test. 
The results are reported in table 4 (results from the first stage are not presented).  
[Table 4 here] 
 The models in general fit well. Given the sample period of this study, the number of 
observations of downturns (703) is smaller than that in upturns (990), which fits our intuition. 
We are interested in whether the fund balance variables exert positive impact during the 
downturn and how they impact the trend during the upturn. In downturns, the balances either in 
level or in ratio do not pose an effect that is significantly different from zero. Among the revenue 
sources, only intergovernmental dollars show a significant estimate in both phases of the cycle; 
that is, during a downturn, the other revenue sources do not seem to play a counter-cyclical role. 
The magnitude of the grants variable is 0.018 percentage points per dollar, which is about 2.2 
percentage points for an average county (= 126 X 0.018), far from enough to raise expenditures 
up to the trend from the level of the constant (-30 percentage points). The share of seniors in total 
population shows a significant, positive effect in downturn years at the magnitude of 0.71 in both 
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the level and the ratio models. At the mean share of seniors (14 percent), the senior population 
may reduce the expenditure gap by about 10 percentage points in a downturn. Population size 
has a similar effect at the magnitude of 0.1 in both specifications, which means the population 
variable may reduce the gap in downturns by 7.8 percentage points. Again, this effect is not 
linear; the quadratic term shows a negative effect.   
In upturn years when the constant is already above the trend (by 16-19 percentage points), 
in contrast, the fund balance ratio is statistically significant (the level variable is marginally 
significant): The balance level can push up the trend further by close to 2 percentage points (96 
X 0.021 = 1.97) and the balance ratio can send the trend up by about the same range (22 x 0.1 = 
2.28). The magnitude of intergovernmental grants nearly doubles (from 0.018 to 0.03). Property 
tax revenue is now also significant at about 0.08 percentage points per dollar, the total effect of 
which can amount to 16 percentage points for an average county. The socio-economic variables 
are not significant but all the three county size binaries are significant and negative, that is, the 
small counties now spend more than their larger counterparts. In sum, we see mainly procyclical 
forces instead of counter-cyclical ones.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
This paper has examined the determinants of local government savings and estimated the 
effects of these accumulated savings on local expenditures. On the determinants of local savings, 
we found the property tax is a major contributor; intergovernmental grants are not, because they 
are for use in the current year. Having local option sales taxes is a strong plus at the local level: It 
may contribute dollar-for-dollar towards savings. Wealth is also a major savings contributor, 
indicating a strong positive relation between income and local savings capacity. Capital outlay 
reduces savings; so does unemployment. The population size of localities presents a nonlinear 
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relationship with fund balances—within a certain range, economies of scale exist. Since local 
governments are at the forefront of public service provision, being small does not necessarily 
render any advantages but increases outlays.  
Using county data in the state of North Carolina in the last two business cycles we have 
tested cyclical features of local expenditures and found their trend to be procyclical. Unlike some 
early evidence that suggests counter-cyclical stabilization properties of local unreserved general 
fund balance, the empirical results of our study do not show that local savings exert counter-
cyclical impact on expenditure. Intergovernmental grants exert a small effect in the downturn but 
its effect in the upturn is much larger. This finding leads us to more questions for further 
exploration: If with a sizable ratio of savings localities still do not act counter-cyclically, they are 
simply following the economic and fiscal tide. The fact that large counties do come closer to the 
trend in upturn years than small ones do may suggest that being small loses the stand to go 
against the tide. If that is the case, how do we design fiscal institutions and budgetary procedures 
that allow the federal or state government to provide more effective fiscal assistance to localities 
without creating a problem of soft budget constraint? 
Our findings carry timely and important policy implications and contribute to the existing 
literature in several important ways. First, the mere size of savings at the local level is probably 
not enough to support a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. If this is true, then studies on the optimal 
size of savings will not shed light on the question. Second, the size of a jurisdiction does matter. 
Since being small does not render any advantage in this aspect, we should give up any unrealistic 
expectations for small localities to be fiscally ―active‖ against the business cycle. Let them focus 
on providing services and not worry about finances. The current study is only among the first 
explorations, more solid work is to be done with better data.        
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Notes 
1. North Carolina had the second highest number of municipal bond defaults during the Great 
Depression; sixty-two of its 100 counties defaulted on the principal, interest, or both by 1932 
(Coe 2007). 
2. The general fund is an accounting term, referring to the fund of a government that holds all 
money that is not specified to other fund types. It is usually the single largest fund of a 
government, covering most operating outlays.  
3. Unless otherwise specified, by ―expenditure‖ we refer to ―general fund expenditures‖ of 
county governments. 
4. In the language of governmental accounting, governmental funds only report a subset of 
related assets and liabilities; so the difference between assets and liabilities is more a measure 
of liquidity than net worth. In this sense, general fund balance is very similar to the working 
capital of a private business. 
5. In 1929 Robeson County became the first county in the U.S. to adopt the county-manger 
form of government. At present 99 of the 100 counties in North Carolina employ a full-time 
professional county manager (Stenberg 2007). 
6. Given the concerns that a county‘s spending behavior may be affected by spending behavior 
among counties in the same region, we ran diagnostic tests for spatial autocorrelation in fund 
balance and expenditure models. The test results did not show a significant effect of spatial 
autocorrelation in the empirical models.   
7. We ran a dynamic fixed-effects model to test the cyclical properties of the expenditure gap 
by regressing it against the annual (first difference) change in per capita total current revenue 
and its lags from one to five years. The results show that the expenditure gap is procyclical; it 
is positively correlated with the annual change in county revenue. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (NC County Data: 1990-2007) 
  
Variable Obs Mean Min Max 
Dependent/Key Variables        
    Fund balance available 1799 95.98 -49.22 839.63 
    Fund balance available as % of total expenditure 1799 22.11 -9.58 138.64 
    First difference of fund balance available 1799 3.12 -206.10 794.64 
    Expenditure gap (%) 1799 0.036 -45.11 89.15 
Revenue Sources        
    Property tax 1799 204.94 65.19 622.19 
    Sales tax 1799 79.01 28.95 258.06 
    Intergovernmental revenue 1799 125.91 33.64 1134.12 
    Total revenue 1799 567.63 246.73 2478.38 
    First difference of total revenue 1699 15.92 -1268.66 1249.96 
    % of property tax in total revenue 1799 37.22 10.51 58.76 
    % of sales tax in total revenue 1799 14.88 4.48 27.46 
    % of intergovernmental revenue in total revenue 1799 22.78 3.26 58.97 
Expenditures         
    Salaries & wages 1799 129.54 49.23 438.09 
    Other operating expenditures 1799 191.41 54.93 944.50 
    Capital outlay 1799 45.22 0.30 1127.87 
    Total expenditure 1799 549.28 247.98 2291.70 
    First difference of total expenditure 1799 17.05 -529.69 831.67 
    Debt service expenditure 1799 38.34 0.00 329.40 
    Changes in debt service 1790 23.13 -100.00 4425.20 
Economic Indicators        
    Personal income (1,000) 1799 12.93 7.86 22.02 
    Unemployment rate (%) 1799 5.73 1.20 19.80 
Social Indicators        
    % of population under 18 1799 23.74 14.95 30.99 
    % of population over 65 1799 14.25 4.44 24.56 
    Population (1,000) 1799 78.29 3.73 859.85 
    Population growth rate (%) 1699 1.41 -3.34 8.22 
County Size by Population (binaries)        
    Large (> 100,000) 1799 0.22 0.00 1.00 
    Medium (50,000-100,000) 1799 0.25 0.00 1.00 
    Medium small (25,000-50,000) 1799 0.24 0.00 1.00 
    Small (<25,000) 1799 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Note: All financial level figures are in per capita real terms.    
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Table 2: Fund Balance Models 
    
  
Fund Balance 
Available (FBA) 
FBA as % of Total 
Revenue 
     
  Coefficient z Coefficient z 
Revenues         
  Property tax 0.354*** 4.080 0.053*** 3.151 
  Sales tax 1.356*** 6.299 0.157*** 3.545 
  Intergovernmental  -0.017 -0.540 -0.006 -0.977 
Expenditures         
  Salaries & wages 0.105 1.310 -0.009 -0.539 
  Other operating 0.022 0.663 -0.008 -1.264 
  Capital outlay -0.028 -0.784 -0.014** -2.030 
Economic indicators         
  Personal income (1,000) 0.005* 1.694 0.001 1.556 
  Unemployment rate -1.545779 -1.703 -0.438* -1.962 
Social indicators         
  % of population under 18 -0.841 -0.303 0.016 0.025 
  % of population over 65 3.572 1.060 0.153 0.219 
  Population (1,000) -0.336** -1.234 -0.144** -2.065 
  Population squared 0.000** 0.774 0.0001* 1.822 
County size         
  Large 13.926 0.894 5.602 1.625 
  Medium 2.794 0.233 2.312 0.947 
  Medium small -12.118 -1.166 -2.236 -1.162 
          
No. of observations 1799   1799   
Prob>F 0.000   0.000   
Centered R-squared 0.269   0.082   
Note: Significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Table 3: Effects of Fund Balances on Total Expenditure 
  
  Total Expenditure   First Difference of Total Expenditure 
  Co-ef z Co-ef z Co-ef z Co-ef z 
    Fund balance availablet-1 0.146** 2.063    0.080 0.883     
    % of fund balance availablet-1     0.322 1.336     0.829** 2.272 
Revenue sources                
    Property tax 0.824*** 4.718 0.841*** 4.743 0.164 0.965 0.182 1.068 
    Sales tax 3.114*** 4.558 3.277*** 4.706 0.480 0.888 0.459 0.858 
    Intergovernmental 0.859*** 6.350 0.858*** 6.368 0.487*** 3.772 0.495*** 3.845 
Economic Indicators                
    Personal income (1,000) 3.875 0.795 4.427 0.905 2.947 0.690 2.454 0.574 
    Unemployment rate -2.096 -1.045 -2.082 -1.032 0.589 0.274 0.792 0.370 
Social Indicators                
    % of population under 18 -3.553 -0.731 -3.995 -0.821 -1.253 -0.259 -1.419 -0.293 
    % of population over 65 6.244 0.919 6.627 0.974 7.208 1.100 7.056 1.085 
    Population (1,000) 1.541** 2.395 1.539** 2.410 1.172** 2.233 1.226** 2.328 
    Population squared -1.085** -2.288 -1.095** -2.328 -0.902** -2.371 -0.936** -2.457 
County Size(binaries)                
    Large -56.794 -1.475 -56.410 -1.450 13.805 0.423 7.221 0.221 
    Medium -75.072** -2.324 -75.234** -2.298 23.716 0.913 19.475 0.751 
    Medium small -69.458** -2.420 -70.736** -2.428 4.475 0.221 3.881 0.192 
No. of observations 1699   1699   1699   1699   
Prob>F 0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000   
Centered R-squared 0.612   0.610   0.105   0.110   
Note: Significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 4: Effects of Fund Balances on Total Expenditure in "Downturn Years" and "Upturn Years" 
         
Heckman Two-Stage Sample Selection Models; DV are Expenditure Gaps      
  Downturn Years (exp gap < 0) Upturn Years (exp gap > 0) 
  Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z 
    Fund balance available t-1 0.003 0.995    0.021 1.631     
    % of fund balance available t-1     -0.003 -0.171     0.103** 2.173 
Revenue Sources                
    Property tax 0.012 1.237 0.012 1.211 0.076*** 3.577 0.079*** 3.642 
    Sales tax -0.003 -0.103 0.003 0.092 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.226 
    Intergovernmental 0.018** 2.065 0.018** 2.064 0.030*** 3.130 0.030*** 3.134 
Economic Indicators                
    Personal income (1,000) 0.023 0.064 0.051 0.145 -0.729 -0.822 -0.703 -0.793 
    Unemployment rate -0.133 -0.821 -0.134 -0.830 0.253 0.390 0.292 0.452 
Social Indicators                
    % of population under 18 0.066 0.185 0.042 0.118 0.596 0.571 0.553 0.533 
    % of population over 65 0.708* 1.711 0.709* 1.713 -0.372 -0.404 -0.296 -0.320 
    Population (1,000) 0.100*** 2.604 0.099*** 2.596 0.013 0.132 0.020 0.192 
    Population squared -0.0001*** -2.732 -0.0001*** -2.743 0.00001 0.065 0.0000 -0.008 
County Size(binaries)                
    Large -3.019 -1.219 -2.931 -1.186 -13.817** -2.487 -14.750*** -2.598 
    Medium 0.236 0.122 0.347 0.181 -7.929* -1.699 -8.556* -1.799 
    Medium small 2.359* 1.951 2.407** 2.006 -6.823* -1.787 -7.106* -1.836 
Constant -30.042** -2.468 -29.887** -2.451 19.148 0.611 16.174 0.513 
Wald X
2
 806.27   810.85   441.34   439.42   
(P>X
2
) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Log pseudo likelihood -3924.82   -3925.22   -3569.61   -3568.79   
Test of indep. Eqns 24.20   24.40   80.97   81.50   
(P>X
2
) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Censored obs 703   703  990   990   
Uncensored obs 990   990   703   703   
Note: Significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
